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a talk
with
Herbet Wittier,
Touche Ross
director of
client mergers
and
acquisitions

The Money Makers
Peter

Hollitscher

After extended discussion—and heated controversy—
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants adopted in July new
rules on accounting for corporate mergers. Designed to
reduce the reporting options open to merging companies, the rules will have a definite effect on new business
combinations—probably leading executives to seek
even more guidance in these delicate dealings.
At Touche Ross the man they will continue to turn to
is our Director of Client Mergers and Acquisitions, Herbert Weiner, a partner with extensive experience with
the intricacies of combining businesses.
Here Mr. Weiner talks with two new associates, Peter
Hollitscher and Norman Schuster, about the ingredients
that bring two companies together in a successful union.
Because many discussions of mergers and acquisitions are concerned with specific techniques and me-

representations and warranties, and elements of control.
If I had to select the one key factor that would culminate
a deal—would change the status quo—I would select
price. With an attractive price a buyer or seller will often
close the transaction in spite of poor chemistry.

chanics, Mr. Weiner has chosen to stress the general
characteristics of a successful deal—and how APB
Opinions 16 and 17 will affect them.

a closing can occur even if the outside party does not
agree. I suppose you might say I hate openings and like
closings. Preliminary shaping by an expert can test
whether the ingredients for a closing are present. If they
are not, breaking off saves the time and expense of conducting negotiations that are doomed to failure.

The function of a catalyst
There has to be something else—a catalyst or maybe
a go-between to prevent outside elements from interfering and to help the chemistry and economics to work?
Right. It is quite possible for the parties to work out a
deal by themselves—even with great chemistry and
economics—and still have it fail. Today, some expertise
is often needed to shape or mold the proposed deal. For
example, the attitude of an outside party, such as the
government, whose approval may be required, can prevent the closing. I prefer to shape the transaction so that

For your convenience, we have included at the end a
summary of the opinions prepared by the AICPA.
The ingredients for closing

A deal with the right chemistry but wrong economics

We find it difficult to tell in advance if a deal—and here
we mean any kind of transaction—is going to close.
We've seen some that looked certain to fall apart. Why
did this happen?

Can you illustrate a deal that has good chemistry but
lacks sound economics?
Sure. A case I had involving a customer-supplier relationship demonstrates the situation. A manufacturer—a
public company—wanted to acquire a leading specialty
regional retailer—a private company—by issuing its
capital stock in exchange for the stock of the retailer.
The managements had worked together for over 20
years and had demonstrated mutual confidence. The
manufacturer's stock was selling at 15 times earnings
and it was willing to pay 12 times earnings for the retailer. The marriage was projected to be beneficial
because

You can tell if a deal has the ingredients for closing,
but they have to be mixed correctly before a deal can
occur. Obviously, everyone would like to prevent a long
and costly pre-closing experience that ends in frustration.
The ingredients are a satisfactory "chemistry" between the parties and an apparent sound economic
benefit for each party. For the right chemistry you need
mutual respect and the ability to work out problems together. Before every transaction closes problems that
were not originally contemplated will be uncovered. If
the people involved can't talk the problems out to a reasonable solution, the deal will fall apart.

1. the manufacturer was not strong in the retailer's region so it had little business to lose,
2. the retailer could shift almost exclusively to this
manufacturer's materials without loss of sales and
profits,

So "chemistry" is the ability to communicate?
Not entirely. To me it is more than that—it is the ability
to create collectively.
What about the economics?

3. thus the manufacturer would have incremental sales
and profits from an under-utilized plant, and

Economic benefit is the essential motivation for the
closing, and price is the key factor in the economic picture. Remember that price includes not only the cash,
notes and securities, but also compensation contracts,

4. the retailer felt it could help acquire more captive
retail business in other regions.
On the face, it appeared that this transaction had both
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chemistry and economics.
The transaction did not close because the manufacturer felt the economic benefits were only short-run.
Apparently, the manufacturer's marketing and sales people reasoned that if they could get the equivalent additional sales from non-captive retailers, the profits of the
manufacturer would rise faster because fewer shares
would be outstanding (those saved by not acquiring the
retailer in question).
There probably was concern, too, that independent
retailers, in other geographic regions where the manufacturer was already strong, might decide to shift business to other manufacturers who were not likely to set
up captive and competing retailers.
Both parties wanted to continue their excellent relationship. As soon as it appeared the proposed acquisition would create economic problems, they broke off
negotiations. The conflict arose not on the basic price,
predicated on earnings, but on what appeared to be a
technical matter—the size of certain book reserves.
Usually, when the deal makes sense, the balance
sheet does not take on such importance. In effect, this
was an indirect way for the manufacturer to announce he
wanted a lower multiple of earnings applied to the retailer's business to take care of his uncertain evaluation,
as buyer, of the long-term economic benefits of the
transaction. The retailer could have lowered its price,
but it did not. It evaluated its future as an independent
optimistically, based on its past record and its current
trend.
So you see, although the chemistry was excellent and
the transaction had favorable short-run benefits, the
deal fell apart because the long-run benefits could not
be projected with adequate certainty by both parties.
Their long-run benefits seemed more secure to both
parties if they stayed separate. I don't have any personal
feelings about the conclusion. All I know is that each
party in substance decided that the proposed transaction lacked sound economics at the price the other party
found satisfactory.

placed a high potential value on the business. In effect
the buyer paid about 20 times earnings in cash.
So far the buyer has been right. Pre-tax operating
profits doubled within five years of the deal.
Was the seller wrong?
Probably not. After the transaction was closed, it was
learned that the seller had tried unsuccessfully for six
months to sell the business at about 16 times earnings.
Small wonder that the buyer was able to repair the negotiations each time they broke apart. In the eyes of each
party, the price looked good.
The seller wanted to diversify his investment. The
buyer wanted a growth business. Each got what he
wanted on the merits of price.
Why the buyer buys
Essentially, what do you feel a buyer looks for? Opportunity?
Right. From an investment standpoint a buyer generally looks for above-average return on investment, consistent with safety. A buyer must consider realistically
the alternative opportunities for investment. Courage is
the essential characteristic of a buyer. The seller is presumed to know all about his industry and his company.
If the seller is willing to dispose of the business, what
makes a buyer think it is a good opportunity? Mostly the
courage to believe that the situation will hold opportunities to make money. To be a buyer one must be an optimist dedicated to seizing and using the opportunity.
Why the seller sells
What is the seller's goal? Insurance?
Yes. The seller owns the business, so he already has
opportunity; but in selling, he seeks to protect his downside risk. The seller is really buying insurance to terminate or reduce his risk.
What is the right price?

What about the reverse?—an illustration of a transaction where the economics were great but the chemistry
poor?

With these conflicting interests—and as you said
earlier that price is critical in putting a deal together—
how do you arrive at the "right" price? It seems to us
that it is especially difficult today. The sellers think it is
still 1968 and value their companies at 20 times earnings
while the buyers think 1970 will go on forever and value
the same companies at 5 times earnings.

I witnessed a good example in the purchase of a large
service business. There buyer and seller had very little
in common and aborted the negotiations several times.
One thing kept them together—the price. The buyer

Value is in the eyes of the beholder. There is no "right"
price. My experience has shown price to be generally
elastic. There is a series of "right" prices—a range in
which the buyer can still see opportunity and the seller

Economics great, chemistry poor

larger company, the multiple of earnings might be from
14 to 16 instead of 12 to 14. Also the prices I quoted
apply to 100% ownership and not to situations in which
there are minority interests.
Can every company be categorized as either a buyer
or a seller?
Such a classification really says: is a company actively
seeking opportunities to employ its assets or is it attempting to minimize its risk-taking? The answer is not
given in terms of sale activity, but on how management
views the business. Stockholders and creditors have an
investment in the gross assets. Does management believe a profit can be produced? Will the profitability be
competitive with that of other businesses? What steps
can be taken to improve profitability? Does the business
have the management to achieve greater profitability?
These and other questions go to the heart of the invest-

can gain insurance. One expert can determine a fair
price that differs from the price of another expert for the
same situation and facts.
One technique I use to pinpoint value, and to avoid
confusion, is to give the range of "right" prices in terms
of all cash. This eliminates the intricate and often confusing valuation problems that exist with notes, bonds,
securities, warrants, and so forth. The all-cash price is
like home base because it is from that price that modifications can be evaluated.
Say, for example, you have a company manufacturing
a proprietary product with sales of $2 million, pre-tax
profits of $400,000 and after-tax profits of $200,000. Assume no long-term debt, a net worth of $1,500,000 and
prospects for growth in earnings. What is the range of
"right" prices, all cash, for the business?
Remembering we are in a world where American Tele-

ment situation and determine whether the business is
essentially a buyer or a seller. In a large corporation,
one division may be a seller, but on balance the corporation may be a buyer. In a small business, management
may be looking for more equity capital, in which case
the business would be considered a buyer because management expects to remain in control. If capital cannot
be obtained on those terms, however, management may
quickly become a seller. Generally, I would say that most
companies are both buyers and sellers—and often
simultaneously.

phone & Telegraph common is selling at 10 times earnings and its bonds are yielding 9% to 10%, I would price
the business in a range of 12 to 14 times earnings, or
$2,400,000 to $2,800,000, all cash, depending on the
evaluation of the growth trend. Of course, some buyers
might refuse to go over $2,000,000 and the seller might
not budge for a price below $3,000,000. Each might base
his position on excellent reasons, but $2,400,000 to
$2,800,000 expresses the range in which I estimate a
buyer and seller could agree.
That seems to be a fair range, but how did you come
up with it?

Effect of the lack of liquidity

Well, that takes some knowledge and a lot of experience. It is an evaluation of alternative uses of $2,400,000
in cash. At interest this money would bring $240,000 annually before tax with safety of principal. At greater risk
—in this illustration, it will bring $400,000 before-tax
income. Notice also that the price range is less than
twice the book net worth. All of this has been simplified
as an all-cash transaction.

We'd like to shift gears now, Herb, from the general
area to certain current problems. What do you feel is the
effect on mergers and acquisitions of the lack of corporate liquidity today?

Yes. Growth in a small company may be more sustained than in a large company, but I value growth in a
larger company at a higher multiple than the equivalent

I think some businesses lack liquidity even in boom
periods. The term "liquidity" puts the problem on too
generalized a basis. It makes more sense to me to refer
to each business as a special case—I like to talk about
the short-term maturities of a particular business. In
boom times there are bankruptcies mostly of smaller
companies—that does not mean all small companies will
go bankrupt. So now in a period of recession, if some
large companies are getting into trouble—and, of
course, there was the bankruptcy of the giant Penn Central Transportation Co., it does not follow that all large

growth of a small company. A large company has developed greater resistance to failure (more depth of management and greater resources to find new management, for example) and is, therefore, worth more. In a

corporations face bankruptcy. Each company is a different credit risk and each, accordingly, has a different
resistance to adversity. That is more meaningful to me
than the general status of lack of corporate liquidity.

Obviously, refinements of contingent payouts (with a
lower cash price at closing) or the use of excess cash in
the seller's business will affect the price.
Does the company's size affect the price?
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company's ability to repay from operations or
assets.
b. Underestimating the time and expense required to
make a new operation self-sustaining or to terminate an old operation. With inflation, extra time has
meant higher costs than contemplated. Often it is
necessary to bring in equity capital or long-term
money in larger proportions than appears needed
in order to adjust for this problem. Financial foresight is necessary, otherwise, some other people in
the business management will enjoy the good things
when they happen because present management
will not survive.

The role of short-term maturities
In your view, the credit risk of a company is based substantially on its short-term maturities?
The credit risk depends on profitability—cash profitability, cash flow. The nature of the industry, the posture
of a particular company, the quality of management—
all have a measure in determining credit risk. It is also
important to know who the credit grantor is. Some credit
people are far more savvy in particular industries than
are others. The short-term maturities define the time
interval available to management for using the assets
without interference.
What do you mean by short-term maturities? Bank
loans and other creditor debt coming due within a year?

c. Delay in starting to use internal means for improving cash flow. Management may not give high priority to selling excess real estate, or to deferring taxes
under special rules or to refinancing debt ahead of
time. The management that delays these responsibilities—which do notappearessential ingoodtimes
but may not be feasible because too late in poor
times—is giving itself less time and fewer options
for solving unexpected problems. By taking these
steps early, management may discover that the
business cannot afford all the expansion that it
planned.

Yes, and much more. To me it is every cash requirement that must be met within a two- to three-year period.
Why such a long time? Because it takes time to arrange
financing, to sell a division or other assets to get cash, to
close down an unprofitable plant, to turn around a loss
operation. The one-year rule is a general principle for
financial reporting. The two- to three-year period I look
at covers cycles of business in general as well as cycles
of a particular company. When you look further ahead
you tend to provide alternative and backup means of
financing.

Herb, it sounds as if now is a bad time to negotiate
acquisitions?

Then a high rent cost or interest charge would be
included in your definition of short-term maturities?
Certainly. If the gross profits from operations drop, it
may not be possible for the business to cover fixed
charges such as rent and interest. Then the business has
to program the working capital requirements to permit
adequate time, either to improve gross profits or to cut
overhead.

No. What I am saying is that today one must think of
survival before one thinks of growth. We are experiencing difficulty in refinancing short-term maturities because of:
1.a business recession coupled with higher cost of
wages and interest,
2. a stock market drop that makes public offerings
very competitive, and sometimes impossible, and
3. a tight bank and institutional money market that
sees interesting alternative uses for money. With
this background, management must weigh acquisitions more carefully and must recognize that prices
have been adjusted downward for the immediate
future.

Pitfalls of short-term maturities
In your experience what types of mistakes are made
in planning to meet short-term maturities?
There are many examples that I have seen and they
include these:
a. Borrowing short to invest long—If you borrow to
build an additional plant and would need five years
to repay, don't start unless you have five-year financing. Don't depend on a refinancing or public
offering to solve the problem. The timing may not

I think we will see very good acquisition opportunities
in the next few years, priced more realistically than
we've seen for a long time. But management must plan
and shape the deals carefully to assure survival in uncharted waters. In fact, divestitures and mergers will be
ways to solve the emergencies being created by current
business conditions.

be convenient. Other examples of this are shortterm loans to buy a business, or revolving loans to
cover fixed investments. The only safe course is to
face up to the facts—make the financing match the
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The effect of the new pooling rules on mergers

pooling, relative size of the merger partners was very
important. To avoid conflict over this issue, the size test
was dropped.

The merger movement has already been effectively
curtailed by a declining stock market, tight money, and
antitrust worries. Do you think the new rules on pooling
will further curtail it?

// the merger qualifies as a pooling, there need be no
accounting for goodwill?
That is correct.

Blame for any further curtailing of mergers should not
be placed on the doorstep of the new pooling rules.
There is no question that the new rules will reduce reported earnings where applicable, but I have never found
accountants to be a cause for creating or killing business.
An artist may express his view of the same object in
different ways at different times. So, too, accountants
may in the future express the financial impact of mergers
in a more restricted way than they did in the past.

What type of industry could suffer from acquisition in
purchase accounting?
Service businesses where the net assets are not large.
The value of the business may be four times net worth—
growth of earnings being a factor to increase the multiple of earnings. Marketing companies or consumer product companies where net assets may not be large, and
where advertising is a large factor may also fall into this
new rule. In other words, where the goodwill is a large
figure in relative terms.

It would be wonderful if everything were simple, but
life isn't simple and financial reporting even less so. The
new rules will be put into practice and financial analysts
will explain how one company's earnings under the rules
compare with another company's earnings not subject
to the rules. As I said, the rules won't make things any
simpler, but in my view, they will not prevent normal
business activity.

Well then don't you feel that prices for these companies will be depressed since if they are purchased the
post-merger earnings could be reduced by goodwill
amortization?
Not really. First of all, they don't have to be part of
any merger. If the earnings grow the stock market will
reward the management for the earnings increases by a
fair multiple. Second, a merger could be made with a
company on an exchange of common stock only so the
pooling rules would apply. It is my feeling people will
always recognize a fine company.

What is the major merger accounting change of the
proposed pooling rules?
In my opinion, reduction of post-merger earnings by
the amortization of goodwill, heretofore not required.
Speaking generally, if the combination qualifies as a
pooling, the old rules continue with some limitations.
The merger qualifies as a pooling if the combination involves the exchange of common stock only for substantially all the common stock interest of the acquired company. If the combination does not qualify as a pooling,
it must be accounted as a purchase, which technique
requires charging the goodwill in the acquisition against
earnings over a period of not more than 40 years. In
purchase accounting, the difference between the price
paid for the acquired company and its book net assets
should be assigned first to all net assets to bring them
from a book basis to a current value basis; any unassignable difference is goodwill. In the past, however, this was
not always done because the goodwill was not required
to be charged to earnings as it now is.

Have the new tax rules of 1969 hurt mergers and acquisitions?
Not to any great degree. A limitation has been imposed on a corporation's deduction of interest on certain
bonds issued on the acquisition of another corporation's
stock or assets. But this will not hurt many corporations
for various technical reasons, one of which is an annual
$5,000,000 interest exemption from the new rule. Effectively then the limitation on the interest deduction is
$5,000,000 when attributable to acquisition debt, subject
to certain adjustments.
Installment method reporting of gain on sale of a business has been made somewhat restrictive in that it
could be harder to meet the 30% test because payments
in the year of sale now include certain evidences of indebtedness designed to make them tradable in an established securities market. But it is still possible to use the
installment method if care is exercised in designing the
evidence of indebtedness.

Will size alone make the difference of whether the
post-merger

earnings must be reduced

by

goodwill

amortization?
No. During the development of the proposed rules in

9

Following is a summary of the conclusions reached by the APB in its Opinion #16, Business Combinations, and
Opinion #17, Intangible Assets:
Business combinations
The purchase method and the pooling of interests
method are both acceptable in accounting for business
combinations although not as alternative accounting
procedures for the same business combination. A business combination which meets specified conditions requires accounting by the pooling of interests method.
All other business combinations should be accounted
for as a purchase of one or more companies by a corporation. The cost of an acquired company should be
determined by the principles of accounting for the acquisition of an asset. The cost of an acquired company
should be allocated to the assets acquired and liabilities
assumed based on the fair values of identifiable individual assets and liabilities, and the remainder of the cost
should be recorded as goodwill.
The following conditions must be met if pooling of
interests accounting is to be used:
• Each of the combining companies is autonomous
and independent and has not been a subsidiary or division of another corporation within two years before
the plan of combination is initiated.
• The combination is effected in a single transaction or is completed according to a specific plan within
one year.1
• A corporation issues only common stock with
rights identical to those of the majority of its outstanding voting common stock in exchange for substantially
all of the voting common stock interest of another
company.
• Each of the combining companies maintains substantially the same voting common stock interest; with
no exchanges, retirements, or distributions to stockholders in contemplation of effecting the combination.
• Each of the combining companies reacquires
shares of voting common stock only for purposes
other than business combinations, and no company
reacquires more than a normal number of shares after
the date the plan of combination is initiated.
• The ratio of the interest of an individual common
stockholder to those of other common stockholders in
a combining company remains the same as a result of
the exchange of stock to effect the combination.
• The voting rights to which the common stock
ownership interests in the resulting combined corporation are entitled are exercisable by the stockholders;
the stockholders are neither deprived of nor restricted
in exercising those rights.
• The combination is resolved at the date the plan
is consummated and no provisions of the plan relating
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to the issue of securities or other consideration are
pending.
• The combined corporation does not agree directly or indirectly to retire or reacquire all or part of
the common stock issued to effect the combination.
• The combined corporation does not enter into
other financial arrangements for the benefit of the
former stockholders of a combining company, such as
a guaranty of loans secured by stock issued in the
combination, which in effect negates the exchange of
equity securities.
• The combined corporation does not intend or
plan to dispose of a significant part of the assets of
the combining companies within two years after the
combination except to eliminate duplicate facilities or
excess capacity and those assets that would have
been disposed of in the ordinary course of business
of the separate company.
Under poolings it has been possible to include the
profits of an acquired company in net income reported
to stockholders even though the pooling took place after
the end of the year reported on. This will now be prohibited.
Intangible assets
A corporation should record as assets the costs of
intangible assets acquired from others, including goodwill acquired in a business combination. A corporation
may record as assets the costs to develop identifiable
intangible assets but should record as expenses the
costs to develop intangible assets which are not specifically identifiable, such as goodwill.
The cost of each type of intangible asset should be
amortized from date of acquisition by systematic
charges to income over the period estimated to be benefited. The period of amortization should not exceed forty
years.
Effective date
The provisions of the Opinions are effective for business combinations initiated after October 31, 1970 and
apply to intangible assets recognized in those combinations or otherwise acquired after October 31,1970.
As defined in Opinion #16, date of initiation is the earlier of (1) the date the major terms of a plan, including
the ratio of exchange of stock, are announced publicly
or otherwise formally made known to the stockholders
of any of the combining companies or (2) the date that
stockholders of a combining company are notified in
writing of an exchange offer.

